This article presents a hierarchy of privacy notions that covers multiple anonymity and unlinkability variants. The underlying definitions, which are based on the idea of indistinguishability between two worlds, provide new insights into the relation between, and the fundamental structure of, different privacy notions. We furthermore place previous privacy definitions concerning group signature, anonymous communication, and secret voting systems in the context of our hierarchy; this renders these traditionally disconnected notions comparable.
INTRODUCTION
With the growing number of services and information offered in the digital world, the number of situations where there is a need to hide the correspondence between individual data items and the people that cause their appearance is also increasing. A variety of privacy protecting systems address this need; anonymous communication systems, for example, hide how transmitted messages correspond to their senders (and their recipients); group signatures hide the identity of the signer of a given message, and secret voting schemes hide the identity of the voter who cast any given ballot. In general, a system is said to provide privacy if it hides, perhaps to an extent, the correspondence between its users and the data items it produces.
What exactly it means for any given privacy protecting system to provide privacy naturally varies between system types. The privacy definition for group signatures [Bellare et al. 2003 ], for example, differs from the definition for anonymous credentials
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The rest of this article is organized as follows. The next section introduces our notation and formal model, and Section 3 presents the hierarchy of privacy notions and examines its structure. Section 3.3, in particular, examines online systems and shows why only some privacy notions apply in such systems, and Section 3.4 examines the conditions under which shuffling is beneficial for a system, and shows that a particular class of shuffling systems (which we call stateless) always provides at least a certain degree of privacy. Section 4 examines group signature, anonymous communication, and secret voting systems in the context of the hierarchy. Section 5 concludes the article.
PRELIMINARIES
This section introduces our notation and formal model. In particular, Section 2.1 introduces the class of systems that are considered in this article, Section 2.2 introduces the different privacy notions considered, and Section 2.3 describes the adversarial model.
System Model
In this article, we consider systems that may be sequentially invoked a finite number of times and that, for each invocation, produce an element e ∈ {0, 1} * . It be required that each invocation be uniquely associated with a user and with an input parameter α ∈ A, where A is a system-specific parameter space, and where the value of α may influence the behavior of the system. It is furthermore required that each user be identified by means of a unique identifier from an identifier space U; it is required that this space be of cardinality at least polynomial in a given security parameter, or infinite if no such parameter is given.
We assume that the system, denoted by A in the remainder of this article, produces its output in batches of potentially varying sizes. That is, it is assumed that, on input a batch of invocations (u 1 , α 1 ), (u 2 , α 2 ), . . . , (u c , α c ) ∈ (U × A) c , A outputs a sequence ((e 1 , . . . , e c ), β), where the sequence (e 1 , . . . , e c ) contains the elements that A produced as a result of the invocations. The order in which the elements appear in this sequence is determined by the system, and may differ from the order of the invocations. In particular, e π(i) is the element that A produces for the invocation (u i , α i ), for some potentially secret A -specific permutation π . Finally, β ∈ {0, 1} * denotes some additional information that A outputs and that pertains to a batch as a whole, that is, that is not associated with any specific invocation.
Remark 1. The system output being generated in batches models the behavior of certain privacy-protecting systems that do not generate an output immediately after each invocation, but rather collect several inputs before producing some output. Mix networks [Chaum 1981 ] and secret voting schemes [Adida 2006 ], for example, operate in this way: mix networks can provide privacy only if they forward multiple messages at a time, and secret voting schemes require multiple votes for different candidates to be cast before the tally is published in order to provide privacy. However, some privacyprotecting systems, for example, group signatures [Bellare et al. 2003 ], do not exhibit this behavior, that is, have batch size equal to 1. These systems are examined in detail in Section 3.3.
Privacy Model
Let n denote the number of times A is invoked in a given period. We assign the serial numbers (1, 2, . . . , n) to each of the n elements that A produces during this period, in the order they are output. The correspondence between the (serial numbers of each) element and the set of users is modelled as a function f ∈ F, where F = { f : {1, 2, . . . , n} → U} is the space of functions that map (the serial number of) each output element to the (identifier of the) user it corresponds to. The privacy notions considered in this article describe potentially different degrees to which f remains hidden from an adversary. The adversary's goal is to identify f , or some 'interesting property' of f , possibly with respect to some subset of elements, through interaction with, or observation of, the system A . We consider the following properties of f with respect to a subset I ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} of element serial numbers, which may be of interest to an adversary. These particular properties were chosen because they divide the function space in an intuitive way, and may be easily deducible from naturally arising background or side channel information. For example, an adversary may be able to learn how many times a given user invokes the system by physical observation. Theorem 3.1 shows the orthogonality of the resulting hierarchy which motivates that the chosen properties are in themselves consistent.
-U f,I = { f (i) : i ∈ I} ⊂ U denotes the participant set, that is, the set of user identifiers that are associated with the elements in I.
-Q f,I = {(u, #u f,I ) : u ∈ U f,I }, where #u f,I = |{i ∈ I : f (i) = u}| ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |U f,I |}, denotes usage frequency set, that is, the collection of records that indicate how many elements correspond to each participant from I's participant set. -P f,I = {I 1 , I 2 , . . . , I |U f,I | } I denotes the linking relation, that is, the partition of I that is induced by f . That is, P f,I denotes the partition that divides I into nonoverlapping subsets such that, for all i, i ∈ I j , f (i) = f (i ). Note that j I j = I. -C f,I = {(1, c 1 ), (2, c 2 ), . . . , (|I|, c |I| )}, where, for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |I|}, c i = |{I ∈ P f,I :
|I | = i}| denotes the cardinalities of equivalence classes as induced by the linking relation. Thus C f,I is the multiset of equivalence class sizes with respect to the linking relation P f,I , that is, C f,I reveals how many elements correspond to each participant from I's participant set. Note that, in contrast to Q f,I , C f,I does not reveal the identifiers of the participants and how they correspond to equivalence class sizes and, in contrast to P f,I , C f,I does not reveal how to partition the elements into equivalence classes (of the revealed sizes).
In the remainder of this article, omission of the modifier I implies that the property under consideration refers to the entire invocations of the system, that is, that I = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Given the above properties, and based on the principle that the adversary should be allowed to break any privacy notion except the one of interest, we informally derive the following privacy notions. These notions are further formalised in Section 3.
-Strong anonymity, denoted SA. A system that provides SA does not enable the adversary to learn any information about how elements correspond to users, that is, it does not leak any information about f . -Strong unlinkability with participation hiding, denoted SUP. A system that provides SUP does not leak any information about f beyond the number of participants |U f |.
In particular, it does not enable the adversary to learn any information about (a) the participant set U f beyond its size, and (b) the linking relation P f beyond the number of equivalence classes it contains. -Strong unlinkability with usage hiding, denoted SUU. A system that provides SUU does not leak any information about f beyond the participant set U f . In particular, it does not enable the adversary to learn any information about (a) the usage frequency set Q f beyond the participant identifiers that appear in it, and (b) the linking relation P f beyond the number of equivalence classes it contains. -Weak unlinkability with participation hiding, denoted WUP. A system that provides WUP does not leak any information about f beyond the equivalence class sizes C f . In particular, it does not enable the adversary to learn any information about (a) the participant set U f beyond its size (which is the number of nonempty equivalence classes), and (b) the linking relation P f beyond the sizes of its equivalence classes. -Weak unlinkability with usage hiding, denoted WUU. A system that provides WUU does not leak any information about f beyond the participant set U f and equivalence class sizes C f . In particular, it does not enable the adversary to learn any information about (a) the usage frequency set U f beyond the participant identifiers that appear in it, and (b) the linking relation P f beyond the sizes of its equivalence classes. -Weak unlinkability, denoted WU. A system that provides WU does not leak any information about f beyond the usage frequency set Q f . In particular, it does not enable the adversary to learn any information about the linking relation P f beyond the sizes of its equivalence classes. -Pseudonymity, denoted PS. A system that provides PS does not leak any information about f beyond the linking relation P f . In particular, it does not enable the adversary to learn any information about the participant set U f beyond what it learns from P f (i.e., its size). This notion is called pseudonymity because the adversary may be able to assign, to each equivalence class in P f , a unique label, or pseudonym. -Anonymity, denoted AN. A system that provides AN does not leak any information about f beyond the linking relation P f and the participant set U f . Intuitively, a system that provides AN may enable the adversary to divide all elements into nonoverlapping groups, and also determine the set of participants they correspond to, but does not enable it to determine which group corresponds to which participant. -Weak anonymity, denoted WA. A system that provides WA does not leak any information about f beyond the linking relation P f and the usage frequency set Q f .
Similarly to AN, WA requires that the system hides the correspondence between element groups and participants. However, since knowledge of Q f may enable the adversary to at least partially establish this correspondence, systems that provide WA (but not AN) hide less information about it than systems that provide AN (which do not reveal any information about it). In the worst case, namely, the case where all equivalence classes in P f are of different sizes, the adversary may be able to unambiguously determine f in its entirety, since each user in Q f would have a unique frequency by which he can be mapped to the correct equivalence class in P f .
Remark 2. A system that provides any of the strong unlinkability variants may leak the number of equivalence classes induced by the linking relation. A system that provides any of the weak unlinkability variants may not only leak the number, but also the sizes of the equivalence classes induced by the linking relation; this information typically allows an adversary to establish the linking relation to a significantly higher degree that knowledge of merely the number of equivalence classes allows. The notions pseudonymity, anonymity, and weak anonymity apply to systems that do not provide any unlinkability guarantee, that is, that may enable the adversary to unambiguously establish the linking relation. Moreover, systems that provide PS or a notion with participation hiding do not leak information about the participant identifiers beyond their number. Systems that provide, on the other hand, AN or a notion with usage hiding may reveal the participant identifiers, but do not leak information about how often each participant invokes the system.
Adversarial Model
This section specifies the adversarial model considered in this article. The adversary, denoted by A in the remainder of this article, adaptively controls the usage of A .
Its interaction with
A is modeled via queries in an experiment that a challenger arranges for A. During this experiment, A may (adaptively) corrupt users via the corrupt query; this models insider attacks.
Remark 3. Our system model does not feature a reveal oracle as known in models for key establishment [Bellare and Rogaway 1993] , which allows A to query session information pertaining to a particular invocation. Such an oracle may appear desirable in order to model situations in which A obtains context information that affects the privacy with respect to a particular invocation. Due to the fact that our adversarial model is based on left-or-right indistinguishability, however, a reveal oracle is not needed as A knows and even chooses itself all user behavior. The system's internal randomness (if any), including the randomness possibly used to compute the potentially secret permutation, is considered to be a system property that faces no danger to be revealed by careless users.
At the beginning of the experiment, the user identifier space U and, if necessary, a security parameter k ∈ N, are fixed and A is set up. The experiment, depicted in Figure 1 , starts with the challenger selecting a bit b ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random, and by setting the initial value of the input counter ic and the batch counter bc to zero.
Values c j will be used to store the size of the batch number j. The challenger then offers the following interfaces to A, through which the system can be controlled.
2 , the challenger increases the counter ic by 1. We denote by u 0,i (respectively u 1,i , α 0,i , α 1,i ) the value of u 0 (respectively u 1 , α 0 , α 1 ) in A's ith input((u 0 , α 0 ), (u 1 , α 1 )) query.
-nextBatch(). On reception of this query type, the challenger invokes
bc j=1 c j ) + ic and returns the system's output. We say that the challenger outputs a batch of size ic in this case.
1 The challenger increases the batch counter bc by 1 and stores the batch size c bc := ic. Subsequently, the input counter ic is reset to zero. -corrupt(·). On input u ∈ U, the challenger outputs the internal state of the user identified by u. The specification of the information that is returned to A is specific to
A may issue a number of queries over these interfaces and, at some point in time, outputs a guess bit g ∈ {0, 1}. We say that A wins the experiment if and only if g = b, and its advantage is given by
In order to describe the course of an experiment, we introduce the following notation. Let κ denote the number of nextBatch queries A has issued up to the point in time it outputs g in an Exp
(k) experiment. Let π j denote the permutation applied by A for the jth batch. Furthermore, let n = κ j=1 c j denote the total number of input((·, ·), (·, ·)) queries that were issued during the experiment. We define the subsets of invocation serial numbers
. . .
and the global inverse permutation as the permutation that maps the serial number of all elements that are output during the experiment to the serial number of their corresponding invocation. That is, permutes (1, 2, . . . , n) such that, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
where j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , κ} is such that i ∈ I j . Finally, the functions f 0 , f 1 are defined such that, for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, f 0 (i) = u 0, (i) and f 1 (i) = u 1, (i) , where (u 0, (i) , u 1, (i) ) is the user pair from A's (i)th input query.
HIERARCHY OF PRIVACY NOTIONS
This section formalizes the privacy notions introduced in Section 2.2 and shows how they relate to each other. We begin by defining the following nine notions of function distinguishability. We are now ready to present our main privacy definitions. The intuition behind these definitions is that a privacy notion X ∈ {SA, SUP, SUU, WUP, WUU, WU, PS, AN, WA} is achieved, if all A, when restricted to X-indistinguishable input functions, have at most a negligible advantage to win the experiment.
Definition 2. A privacy protecting system
A is said to unconditionally (respectively, statistically) provide privacy notion X ∈ {SA, SUP, SUU, WUP, WUU, WU, PS, AN, WA} if and only if the adversary A is restricted to invocation sequences (u 0,i , α 0,i ) i and (u 1,i , α 1,i ) i such that f 0 and f 1 are X-indistinguishable with respect to all I ∈ 2 {I 1 ,...,I κ } , and, for all such adversaries A, it holds that Adv
A is said to computationally provide privacy notion X if and only if, for all A with a running time polynomial in k, it holds that Adv
The above privacy notions are very strong because they require that A does not obtain any advantage neither by corrupting users, nor on the basis of the parameter values that it passes in its input queries. We therefore require weaker notions that take corrupted users into account and that limit A's ability to distinguish between the two worlds on the basis of parameter values. The following notion of function indistinguishability is therefore necessary.
Definition 3. Two functions f 0 , f 1 ∈ F are said to be indistinguishable with respect to a subset of (corrupted) usersÛ , denoted f 0 ≈Û f 1 , if and only if, for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,
LetÛ ⊆ U denote the set of users that A has corrupted at any time during the experiment, and let A 0 = (α 0,1 , α 0,2 , . . . , α 0,n ) and A 1 = (α 1,1 , α 1,2 , . . . , α 1,n ) denote the parameter sequences in the two worlds. We now present our weaker, more realistic notions.
Definition 4. A privacy protecting system
A is said to unconditionally (respectively, statistically, computationally) provide privacy notions X x for X ∈ {SA, SUP, SUU, WUP, WUU, WU, PS, AN, WA} and x ∈ {•, +, * }, if and only if A is restricted concerning X as Table I . Adversary Restrictions for •, +, and * Notions.
Privacy notion
Restrictions
(k) for defining privacy notions.
in Definition 2 and, additionally, concerning x as shown in Table I , and, for all such A, it holds that Adv
A is said to computationally provide privacy notion X x if and only if for all A with a running time polynomial in k, it holds that Adv
The experiment for Definition 4 is depicted in Figure 2 .
Relations Between Notions
For all X ∈ {SA, SUP, SUU, WUP, WUU, WU, PS, AN, WA}, it trivially holds that, if A is more restricted in its choices, the corresponding notion gets weaker. Therefore, X describes the strongest and X * the weakest notion. The resulting hierarchy is displayed in the following lattice.
The privacy notions X * are, perhaps, the most typical ones as they are concerned with the amount and type of information the system leaks exclusively on the basis of the identities of honest users. The notions X + are stronger, in the sense that a system providing some notion X + must not enable A to distinguish between system invocations on the basis of the parameters passed to the system; the system must ensure that the output corresponding to different users is indistinguishable, irrespective of the two users' potentially different input.
The privacy notions X • can be seen as a form of forward/backward privacy, analogous to notions of forward and backward security for encryption schemes. Forward privacy means that, even if a user is compromised via a corrupt query, the user's system interactions that occurred prior to this corruption remain private. Similarly, backward privacy means that system interactions of a user remain private, even if the user was corrupted prior to these interactions. Section 4.1 shows that the established privacy notion for group signatures is a forward/backward privacy notion.
Relations between privacy notions. The arrow labels indicate the property about f that the system may reveal. From left to right, more information about the linking relation P f is revealed; from top to bottom, more information about the user involvement Q f is revealed.
The privacy notions X are very strong, in the sense that a system providing X protects the privacy of all users, honest and corrupted alike, and does not enable A to distinguish between system invocations on the basis of the parameters passed to the system. That is, a system provides the notion X only if it provides X + and X • at the same time. Figure 3 shows the relations between different privacy notions of one type. These relations follow from the facts that knowledge of Q f implies knowledge of U f and C f , knowledge of P f implies knowledge of C f , and that knowledge of either U f or C f implies knowledge of |U f |. The same hierarchy also applies to the privacy notions X + , X
Relations Among Notions of One Type
• , and X * . The following theorem states that, if a system provides two mutually distinct privacy notions, then it also provides the combined privacy notion as indicated in Figure 3 . This shows that our privacy hierarchy is closed. 
PROOF. (a) Assume there exists an adversary A that has advantage Adv
The input sequences (u 0,i , α 0,i ) i and (u 1,i , α 1,i ) i , chosen by A, are therefore such that the induced functions f 0 and f 1 are WUU-indistinguishable. That is, C f 0 = C f 1 and U f 0 = U f 1 . We assume that P f 0 = P f 1 and
We construct an adversary A on WU or AN that uses A as a black box. A executes A and starts collecting A's input queries. Whenever A issues a nextBatch query, A constructs a sequence (u 2,i , α 2,i ) i such that the resulting function f 2 is, simultaneously, WU-indistinguishable from f 0 and AN-indistinguishable from f 1 . That is, f 2 is constructed such that U f 2 = U f 1 = U f 0 , P f 2 = P f 0 , and Q f 2 = Q f 1 . Note that constructing f 2 in this way is always possible because, since f 0 and f 1 are WUU-indistinguishable, (k), it uses the input sequences (u 2,i , α 2,i ) i and (u 1,i , α 1,i ) i . The system's response is forwarded to A. The corrupt queries are simply passed through by A. Once A outputs a guess bit g, A uses g as its own guess.
Let R be the probability that A outputs g = 0 when facing the system output on the sequence (u 2,i , α 2,i ) i . Then the advantage of A in Exp
The proofs for (b) and (c) are analogous. In (b), given f 0 and f 1 that are WUPindistinguishable, f 2 is constructed such that f 0 and f 2 are PS-indistinguishable and f 1 and f 2 are WUU-indistinguishable. In (c), given f 0 and f 1 that are SUPindistinguishable, f 2 is constructed such that f 0 and f 2 are WUP-indistinguishable and f 1 and f 2 are SUU-indistinguishable.
Remark 4. The privacy notion unobservability, as for example, considered in Pfitzmann and Köhntopp [2000] and Hevia and Micciancio [2008] , is not part of our model. Intuitively, unobservability is a privacy notion that ensures that A cannot determine whether or not a system invocation takes place. A system can only provide unobservability if its output in response to one or more invocations is indistinguishable from its output in the absence of invocations. Hence, adding support for unobservability requires changes to our generic system model in Section 2.1 and, possibly, to the adversarial model in Section 2.3. While such changes are certainly possible, they are outside the scope of this article because unobservability appears to apply mostly to anonymous communication systems where, under certain conditions, it is equivalent to "strong anonymity" (see Remark 9). Adding support for unobservability into the generic system model without limiting its generality is left for future work.
Online Systems
This section examines systems that process every input individually, that is, systems that have a constant batch size equal to 1. While such systems, which we call "online" systems, enable A to trivially keep track of the mapping of input queries and the elements produced by the system, our definition still requires A to determine whether it is interacting in the left or the right world. Nevertheless, the mere fact that A can unambiguously determine which output elements correspond to which invocation serial numbers has implications to the introduced hierarchy of privacy notions.
PROOF. Assume that f 0 = f 1 , i.e. that there exists at least one i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} such that f 0 (i) = f 1 (i). Then U f 0 ,{i} = U f 1 ,{i} , contradicting the assumption.
The implication of Lemma 3.2 is that, for online systems, there exist no functions f 0 and f 1 , f 0 = f 1 , that are X-indistinguishable for any X ∈ {SUU, WUU, WU, AN, WA}; moreover, the notions SUP, WUP, and PS coincide. This can be seen easily: if, for all I ∈ 2 {1,2,...,n} , |U f 0 ,I | = |U f 1 ,I | = 1, then the equivalence classes of the partition of elements must be identical in f 0 and f 1 . Hence, P f 0 = P f 1 and C f 0 = C f 1 . The resulting collapsed hierarchy of privacy notions is sketched in Figure 4 .
Shuffling Versus Nonshuffling Systems
This section analyses when and how the act of shuffling is beneficial for the privacy of the system. We informally argue that, (a) depending on the extent to which the output elements (e and β) leak information about their corresponding invocations, shuffling may or may not be beneficial, and (b) for certain systems, secret shuffling is sufficient to provide WU. Consider a system where each of its outputs e does not depend on any invocation other than the one that caused it. We call such systems stateless because, except possibly for the computation of β, they do not have to keep any state about the history of events within a batch. A system is furthermore said to be shuffling if, before outputting elements, it applies a random permutation to them. Shuffling certainly makes only sense if neither β, nor the elements themselves, reveal the order in which the system produces its outputs. We note that a stateless nonshuffling system A can be transformed into a shuffling one by means of a shuffler, as follows.
c , invokes a system A on this batch, and outputs ((e π (1) , e π (2) , . . . , e π (c) ), β), where ((e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e c ), β) is A 's output and π is a permutation chosen uniformly at random.
Consider a system whose output elements e enable A to extract information about the parameters α, but no information about the user identifiers, of their corresponding invocations. Also assume that β leaks no further information. The strongest privacy notion that this system may provide is SA
• , because X • notions are the strongest privacy notions that require the parameter sequences A 0 and A 1 to be identical (hence, by definition, the parameters do not reveal the secret bit b). Observe that this holds irrespective of whether or not the system shuffles 2 ; since A can map output elements to their corresponding invocations (by parameter values) anyway, shuffling does not buy any privacy advantage for such systems.
Consider, on the other hand, a system whose output elements e do enable A to extract information about the identifier of the user of the corresponding invocation, but where neither the elements e, nor β reveal any information about the corresponding input parameters. In this case, A learns Q f b . That is, A can recognize which user invoked the system how often. Nevertheless, such a system may still provide some privacy. In fact, the strongest privacy notion that a nonshuffling system of this type may achieve is WA because, since the system does not shuffle, it does not hide the partition P f b -its outputs are partitioned in the same way as its inputs. (Online systems also provide WA as long as neither the elements e, nor β leak any information about the input parameters α.) A shuffling system of this kind may, on the other hand, maximally achieve WU, since the shuffle may hide P f (but not Q f ). If A is also able to obtain information about parameter values from β (which is not linked to individual elements), then only WA
• is possible (for nonshuffling systems), and WU
• (for shuffling systems). Consider a stateless system that, for every batch I, encodes the variables (Q f I , P f I ) in β.
4 If the system's output elements e do not carry extractable information about their corresponding invocations, that is, user identifiers and parameter values (this could be achieved, for example, by probabilistic encryption), then this system provides WA x , where x depends on the details of the system. This, in conjunction with Theorem 3.3, shows that, for any stateless system that does not leak information about parameter values (e.g., by means of probabilistic encryption) and that does not leak information about f I in β beyond (Q f I , P f I ), superimposing a shuffler S on the system is sufficient to provide WU.
APPLICATIONS
This section places the privacy definitions concerning group signature, anonymous communication, and secret voting systems into the hierarchy introduced in the previous section.
Group Signatures
Group signatures represent an important class of privacy protecting system. A group signature system consists of four algorithms (GKg, GSig, GVf, Open), as follows [Bellare et al. 2003 ].
-The randomised group key generation algorithm GKg takes as input a security parameter k ∈ N, and returns a tuple (gpk, gmsk, gsk), where gpk is the group public key, gmsk is the group manager's secret key, and gsk is an vector of keys where gsk [u] is the secret signing key of user identified by u ∈ U, and where the length of the vector is polynomially bounded in k. -The randomized group signing algorithm GSig takes as input a secret signing key gsk [u] and a message m ∈ M, where M is the system's message space, and returns a signature of m under gsk [u] (u ∈ U). -The deterministic group signature verification algorithm GVf takes as input the group public key gpk, a message m, and a candidate signature σ for m, and returns either 1 or 0. -The deterministic opening algorithm Open takes as input the group manager secret key gmsk, a message m, and a signature σ of m, and returns an identifier u ∈ U or the symbol ⊥ to indicate failure.
4.1.1. Full Anonymity. We briefly revisit the definition of full anonymity as defined in Bellare et al. [2003] . Full anonymity is defined by means of an FA experiment between an adversary A FA and a challenger, which proceeds as follows. Initially, A FA the same pair present in both worlds. In fact, in reality, systems that reveal both users and their input should not be considered privacy preserving. 4 In practice, an adversary may infer the partition and/or the invocation frequency from context, background, and/or network layer information.
is given gsk and gpk, and access to an opening oracle Open(·, ·) that, on input a message/signature pair (m, σ ), outputs Open(gmsk, m, σ ). At some point in time, A FA outputs a triple (u 0 , u 1 , m ) and the challenger returns σ = GSig(gsk[u b ], m ), where b ∈ {0, 1} is chosen uniformly at random. A FA is then required to output a guess for b; before doing this, it may again query the Open(·, ·) oracle, albeit not on (·, σ ). A FA wins if its guess is correct, and the system is said to provide full anonymity, denoted FA, if no adversary can win the game with nonnegligible advantage over random guessing.
We now examine how FA relates to the privacy notions as defined in the previous section. Translated to our model, the parameter space of a group signature scheme is its message space. That is, A gs = M. Since users compute and independently release signatures by themselves, the adversary is able to observe isolated system invocations. Thus group signature schemes are online systems, and, hence, the only applicable privacy notions are SA and PS.
5 The specification of the corrupt(·) query for group signatures systems is as follows.
-corrupt(·). On input u ∈ U, the challenger outputs the secret key of the user identified by u, that is, gsk [u] .
Note that our model lacks the Open oracle. This oracle, which has the flavor of a "reveal" oracle, does not take official invocations of the system as input but rather private computations of the adversary. That is, according to the model in [Bellare et al. 2003 ], a cryptographic group signature scheme can be invoked locally by the adversary and is not a central system as we assume in our model. Our model is nevertheless useful in analyzing group signatures. To this end, we simply add the Open oracle to our model without modifications. 6 The anonymity notion without the Open oracle, which would be the straightforward notion in our model, is called CPA anonymity ].
-Open(·, ·). On input (m, σ ) where σ is a valid group signature of m this oracle applies the Open(gmsk, m, σ ) algorithm and returns an identifier u ∈ U or the symbol ⊥ to indicate failure.
We now show why certain privacy notions do not apply to group signature systems, while others are equivalent. Goldwasser and Micali [1984] , it can be shown that A FA 's success probability is (1/2) + δ/q, where q and δ are the number of queries issued by A SA
• and A SA • 's advantage, respectively. Since, as shown in Section 3.3, SA
• implies PS • , a group signature system that provides FA also provides PS
• .
The fact that there exists only a single (computational) forward/backward privacy notion for group signatures, explains, perhaps, why Bellare et al. [2003, page 623] claimed that "anonymity and unlinkability are technically the same property."
Remark 5. From our framework it is now obvious that weaker privacy notions for group signatures exist; it is possible to refrain from forward/backward privacy, and optionally in addition tolerate the group signatures of the same signer being linkable. Traceable group signature schemes were to our knowledge first considered in Kiayias et al. [2004] . We modify a traceable scheme from to construct an instance of a group signature scheme that provides PS * but not SA * . The required modification is minor, as it merely consists in setting a particular parameter of the scheme to 1. We now briefly review the modified scheme; for a complete description, see . The scheme uses a bilinear group pair (G 1 , G 2 ) consisting of cyclic groups G 1 and G 2 of prime order p with an efficiently computable isomorphism from G 2 to G 1 , and an efficiently computable nondegenerate bilinear map e : G 1 × G 2 → G t . For (G 1 , G 2 ), the strong Diffie-Hellman assumption (see ) has to hold. A public group key gpk is given by a triple of group elements (g 1 , g 2 , g γ 2 ), where g 1 ∈ G 1 , g 2 ∈ G 2 are randomly chosen from the respective groups and act as generators, and γ is secretly and uniformly at random chosen from Z p . Then a private signing key for a user U i is given by (
for a uniformly at random chosen element x i ∈ Z p . Furthermore, a hash function H : {0, 1} * → G 1 × G 2 is given. The signing procedure is as follows.
(
1) (u, v) ← H(gpk).
(2) Choose α ← Z p uniformly at random and compute
, s δ as a witness-indistinguishable proof of knowledge for the correct computation of T 1 , T 2 with respect to the private key A i . This is done with the Fiat-Shamir [1988] heuristic and involves the message being signed.
The signature of a message is then given by (T 1 , T 2 , c, s α , s x , s δ ). Now any two group signatures of the same signer can be linked by computing e(A i , u) = e(T 2 , u)/e(T 1 , v), which is a value that, since the parameters u, v are common to the entire group, depends only on the signer's private key. Since this value cannot be traced back to any particular public key, some privacy remains.
Remark 6. We are not aware of any group signature scheme that provides SA * but not FA at the same time, that is, a scheme without forward-/backward privacy. The following example, however, demonstrates the existence of such a scheme. Consider a group signature scheme that provides FA. We modify this scheme as follows. Every signer is given a pseudorandom number generator whose seed is part of the user's secret key and, in order to sign a message, the user replaces all random choices by pseudorandomness. As a result, every user behaves deterministically and, as long as the adversary does not know a user's seed, the produced signatures are computationally indistinguishable from those based on true randomness. Moreover, once the adversary calls corrupt on a user and learns his or her seed, all past and future signatures of this user become linkable; the modified scheme no longer provides forward-/backward privacy. In fact, it provides computational SA * . Note that this scheme might well apply to smart-card group signature implementations where replacing randomness by pseudorandomness is a common option.
Anonymous Communication
Anonymous communication systems are modeled as protocols that transmit messages from senders to recipients. The input to an anonymous communication system is a sequence of tuples of the form (σ, (m, ρ)) ∈ U × (M × U), where σ, ρ ∈ U are identifiers of the sender and the intended recipient, respectively, M is the system's message space, and m ∈ M is the message that is to be transmitted from σ to ρ. The output that is associated to an input of this form, is the bitstring that the system produces as a result of this input, and that A can observe.
Remark 7. Depending on the concrete adversary model, each invocation may produce elaborate outputs. In a mix network [Chaum 1981 ], for example, the ith invocation may cause several encrypted versions of the involved message to be transmitted over the network and potentially observed by A. One possible modeling for a mix network is to encode the message leaving the exit node into e i and the remaining encryptions as well as observable metadata (e.g., timing information) in β. An example for such a modeling in the context of secure voting is outlined in Remark 11.
For anonymous communication systems, we define two variants of the experiment Exp
(k), depending on whether the experiment is intended to capture the privacy of senders or the privacy of recipients. In particular, the variant that captures sender privacy is denoted by Exp
(k), and the variant that captures recipient privacy by
(k). In both variants, the parameter space is A ac = M × U. The difference between the two variants is the way in which the challenger assigns the sender and recipient roles to the users indicated in an input((·, ·), (·, ·)) query; in all other respects the two variants are identical to the base experiment. (m 1 , u 1 )) ) query in the context of an Exp
(k)) experiment, the challenger first increases the input counter ic by one, and then remembers (u b (m b , u b ) )) as (u ic , α c ) to be input into the system. In other words, the parameter α = (m, u) ∈ A ac either specifies a message together with its intended recipient (in the context of an Exp
(k) experiment), or a message together with its sender (in the context of an Exp
(k) experiment). We now extend our generic definition for the context of anonymous communication.
Definition 7. An anonymous communication system
A ac is said to unconditionally (respectively, statistically, computationally) provide 'sender-X x ', denoted S/ X x (respectively, 'recipient-X x ', denoted R/ X x ) for some privacy notion X x where X ∈ {SA, SUP, SUU, WUP, WUU, WU, PS, AN, WA} and x ∈ { * , •, +}, if and only if it unconditionally (respectively, statistically, computationally) provides X x with respect to an Exp
(k)) experiment. If the modifier x is omitted, then the restrictions of Table I do not apply.
It trivially follows from the definition that S/SA and R/SA, as well as S/SA + and R/SA + , are equivalent notions. We define one more privacy notion, namely, unlinkability, denoted UL. UL is specific to anonymous communication systems, and, like SA * , its sender and recipient versions are equivalent. Unlinkability is the notion that ensures that A cannot learn anything about f beyond what follows from knowledge of how many messages each sender sent, and how many messages each recipient received. 1,2 ) , . . . , (·, u 1,n )) denote parameter sequences issued by the adversary during an Exp
Definition 8. An anonymous communication system
A ac is said to unconditionally (respectively, statistically, computationally) provide privacy notion UL * (respectively UL
• , UL + , UL), called unlinkability, if and only if it unconditionally (respectively statistically, computationally) provides WU * (respectively WU • , WU + , WU) with respect to an Exp
(k) experiment with the restriction that for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, u 0,i = u 1,i .
Remark 8. Anonymous communication systems that support multicast accept invocations that specify multiple recipients, for example, using tuples of the form (σ, (m, (ρ 1 , ρ 2 , . . . ))). While the sender privacy notions R/ X are defined in an identical manner for multicast systems, recipient versions remain undefined in our framework, because our generic system model in Section 2.1 requires each system invocation to be associated with a single user. Hence, fully modeling anonymous communication systems with multicast support remains a future work item.
4.2.1. Existing Notions. We briefly revisit the privacy notions defined in Hevia and Micciancio [2008] in order to examine how they relate to the ones defined above. Hevia and Micciancio [2008] defined privacy by means of an experiment between an adversary and a challenger. The adversary specifies in advance two collections C 0 and C 1 of triples of the form (σ, ρ, m) ∈ U 2 × M. 7 The two collections are then given to the challenger, which selects a bit b ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random, and simulates A ac on input the triples in C b . The adversary, given A ac 's output, then produces a guess g for b and wins if and only if g = b; its advantage, defined in the usual way, should not exceed a quantity that is negligible in the system's security parameter.
Let
} denote the set of senders and recipients according to
) the multiset of messages sent by σ (respectively, received by ρ) according to C b . The different privacy notions defined in Hevia and Micciancio [2008] arose due to restrictions imposed on the adversary in the construction of C 0 and C 1 . In particular, an anonymous communication system was said to provide privacy notion N ∈ {SUL, RUL, Table II . Conditions According to Privacy Definitions by Hevia and Micciancio [2008] 
Privacy notion Label Conditions
Sender unlinkability Table II are satisfied, has a nonnegligible advantage in the above experiment.
Comparison to Existing
Notions. The adversarial model in Hevia and Micciancio [2008] does not consider corrupted users, and does not consider adaptive adversaries. Translated to our system model, this amounts to the setting where A issues only a single nextBatch query, and no corrupt(·) queries. Due to this discrepancy of the adversarial models, the privacy notions defined in this article are not directly comparable to the ones defined in Hevia and Micciancio [2008] . If, however, A is restricted to observe only a single batch and is allowed no corruptions, then the following notions are equivalent. (ρ 1 , m 1 ) Hevia and Micciancio [2008] showed that, in the presence of appropriately generated dummy traffic and an upper limit on the number of messages that may be sent, (S/R)SA + and UO are equivalent notions. These observations as well as the relations between the anonymous communication system-specific privacy notions, are consistent with the hierarchy introduced in this article.
LEMMA 4.3. If, during an Exp
Remark 10. Pfitzmann and Köhntopp [2000] 8 informally defined relationship anonymity as the notion that ensures that every transmitted message is unlinkable to every potential sender/recipient pair. In footnote 39, page 15, the authors claimed that "the classical MIX-net without dummy traffic is one implementation with just this property: The attacker sees who sends messages when and who receives messages when, but cannot figure out who sends messages to whom." Intuition therefore suggests that UL may be the formal notion that approximates the intent of Pfitzmann and Köhntopp [2000] ; UL ensures that A learns no information about the relationship between elements and senders, and the relationship between elements and recipients (and hence the relationship between senders and recipients), beyond what can be deduced from the knowledge of how many messages each sender sent and each recipient received. In general, the informal privacy definitions from Pfitzmann and Köhntopp [2000] cannot be mapped to the notions defined in this article because they leave too much room for interpretation, and because they seem to be more concerned with soft metrics rather than hard privacy guarantees.
While the adversary in Hevia and Micciancio [2008] may observe only a single communication batch, our adversary may adaptively influence the system over multiple communication batches. Hence, the equivalences from Lemma 4.3 may no longer hold if the single nextBatch query restriction is removed. That is, the notions S/WU, R/WU, UL, S/SA, R/SA, S/WU + , R/WU + , and (S/R)SA + are all stronger than SUL, RUL, UL, SA, RA,SA * ,RA * , and RA * , respectively. Consider, for example, an anonymous communication system that provides notion RA, that is, a system where, for an adversarially chosen batch of communications (where certain conditions hold), the adversary may be able to determine which messages were received by which recipients, but no information beyond this. In contrast to this, the system would only provide notion S/SA if it does not leak any such information even for multiple, adversarially and adaptively chosen batches of communication (where certain conditions hold). This suggests that an anonymous communication system provides a privacy notion in {S/WU, R/WU, UL, S/SA, R/SA, S/WU + , R/WU + , (S/R)SA + } only if it is effectively immune to intersection (also known as disclosure or hitting set) attacks Kesdogan et al. 2003 ], while privacy notions in {SUL, RUL, UL, SA, RA, SA * , RA * , SRA} can be achieved without such immunity.
Voting Systems
A typical voting process has, among other things, a phase where users cast their votes, called the voting phase, and a phase where the results of the elections are computed and published, called the tallying phase. Although secret voting systems have to fulfill a multitude of requirements, such as public verifiability and coercion resistance, in this article we focus only on ballot secrecy, since this is a privacy notion. 9 Moreover, we assume that each eligible voter is allowed to cast at most one vote.
Voting systems are modeled as follows. During the voting phase, the system accepts pairs (u, w) ∈ U × W, where U is the set of (the identifiers of) the eligible voters, and W is the set of candidates in the election. The adversary can cause a ballot to be cast by issuing an input query, and indicate the end of the voting phase by issuing a nextBatch query. The bitstring β that the system produces as part of its output contains the tally and additional information that may be needed for verification. Since no further voting is possible after the tally is computed, voting systems produce only a single batch.
Ballot secrecy can be modeled in two ways within our framework. The first, perhaps more intuitive one, is as follows. First, the parameter space of voting systems is defined as A 1 vs = W. The challenger, on reception of an input((u 0 , w 0 ), (u 1 , w 1 )) query, then invokes the system with input (u b , w b ). The corrupt(u) queries are not needed; instead, any (cryptographic) secrets known to a user should be given to the adversary straight away, as privacy should not depend on such information for reasons of coercion resistance. To avoid that the adversary can trivially distinguish the two inputs, the election result has to be identical. This is guaranteed in X
• notions. Note that voting schemes based on blind signatures (e.g., Fujioka et al. [1993] ) fit this modeling particularly well. PROOF. The tally reveals the number of participants, as this matches the total number of ballots. Thus, SA
• -indistinguishable functions can be distinguished from the system output β.
Unfortunately, not all voting systems can be modeled in the above way. Certain voting systems produce encrypted ballots and do not hide the correspondence between these ballots and the voters. Two types of voting system fall into this category, namely, "homomorphic voting systems" [Adida 2006 ], where homomorphic properties of the encryption are used for tallying, and "shuffling voting systems" [Chaum 1981 ], where the ballots are shuffled before they are opened for tallying.
10 Both system types provide privacy by ensuring that the identity of the selected candidate, which is encoded in each encrypted ballot, remains hidden.
In the following we focus on shuffling voting systems. A basic shuffle-based voting scheme operates as follows. In the voting phase, the system takes as input voter/candidate pairs. For each voting event, the system internally produces an encryption of the identity of the candidate. In the tallying phase, a verifiable shuffle permutes and reencrypts the encrypted ballots. The shuffled ballots are then output by the system as elements e, and the original encrypted ballots and a proof that the shuffle was honestly executed is given in the additional output β. The decrypted ballots and the final tally are also included in β.
We model the voting system in our framework through a reversal of the roles of voters and candidates. That is, instead of treating ballot secrecy as a privacy property concerning voters, it is treated as a privacy property concerning candidates. A system is then said to provide ballot secrecy if it hides the identities of the users that have voted for any given candidate; it is easy to see that this is equivalent to the case where it hides the identity of the candidate any given user has voted for. This reversal, however, enables us to alternatively define A's interaction with the challenger based on candidates rather than voters. In particular, the parameter space for voting system as A 2 vs = U, where U is the identifier set of eligible voters, and W is used as the set of users. In particular, on reception of an input((w 0 , u 0 ), (w 1 , u 1 )) query, the challenger invokes the system A 2 vs on input (u b , w b ). As previously explained, a corrupt() query is not defined. In order to break privacy, A would have to identify two (encrypted) ballots for the same candidate, or reveal the candidate of one ballot. We now show why the strongest possible notion for ballot secrecy is weak unlinkability. Remark 11. A voting system that uses shuffling for tallying is an example for a shuffling system, as discussed in Section 3.4. The outputs of the system are decrypted ballots that show the candidate voted for (which is the user in our modeling). The input parameter, namely, the voter, does not appear in the system output. In β additional proofs of correctness of the shuffle and decryption are given which must not reveal information that enables linking elements to the voter. A voting scheme with an underlying encryption scheme that is IND-CPA [Goldwasser and Micali 1984] , which uniformly permutes the encrypted ballots before decrypting and publishing them, and which uses zero-knowledge proofs in β, will provide computational WU and therefore achieve the (computational variant of the) highest possible privacy for such a system [Neff 2001 ].
CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN QUESTIONS
We presented an application-agnostic hierarchy of privacy notions that describe potentially different degrees to which the correspondence between digital elements and the users that cause their appearance remains hidden from an adversary. Compared to an earlier version, new privacy notions have been introduced to complete the structure. A theorem showed the orthogonality and completeness of the new hierarchy.
Previously isolated privacy notions pertaining to group signature, anonymous communication, and secret voting systems have been placed into this hierarchy, and thereby effectively made comparable. It is possible that privacy definitions pertaining to other system types, such as anonymous credentials, data anonymization systems, and sensor information systems, can also be placed into our framework. Examining this possibility is subject of future research.
Our framework provides valuable insights into the relations and structure of different privacy notions, and highlights a largely unexplored space of such notions. As examples, we identified two new notions for group signatures and pointed out how group signatures that match these definitions look like. Identifying useful schemes providing other "new" notions, perhaps by trading off privacy against other features, is subject of future research. Of particular interest are techniques that transform systems achieving a given privacy notion into systems that provide another, perhaps stronger, one in the adaptive adversarial model considered in this article. We expect that the framework will also be useful in the construction and analysis of "multilayer" privacy protecting systems, that is, systems that combine, for example, anonymous communication with group signing.
Finally, constructing "soft," probabilistic privacy metrics for each of the notions in our framework is the subject of current research. Such metrics will enable us to compare privacy-protecting systems with considerably higher granularity than is possible with definitions that are based on asymptotic polynomial indistinguishability.
